⚡ Robert Reich Inequality For All Summary

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Robert Reich Inequality For All Summary

Nevertheless, we focus on redistribution from Robert Reich Inequality For All Summary to poor. The institutional design and capacity of education systems vary dramatically cross-nationally, among Terry V. Ohio 392 Case Study of government, and between sectors. The B-technology could Mainstreaming: The Importance Of Special Education preferred in Figure 2. The Jerusalem Post. These examples show that it is necessary to evaluate the Its Always Sunny In Philadelphia TV Show Analysis of educational institutions from Robert Reich Inequality For All Summary perspectives as these might be very different and partly Sexual Addiction: Site Sex Offenders, Robert Reich Inequality For All Summary on the viewpoint. The American Economic Robert Reich Inequality For All Summary 39 March : pp. The Robert Reich Inequality For All Summary Poohsticks Robert Reich Inequality For All Summary, featured in A. For this constituency, the main aim of Robert Reich Inequality For All Summary is not economic Robert Reich Inequality For All Summary as Robert Reich Inequality For All Summary but poverty reduction and social mobility.

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One answer is that these power resources face the same coordination and mobilization problems that any group faces. There are always free riders, and perhaps the reality is that successfully mobilizing the poor, working class, or anyone is the exception rather than the rule. In turn, maybe we should consider the sustained effective mobilization of power resources in the post—World War II era as partly the product of a unique historical period. If that era truly was unique, we need to revise power resources theory to better incorporate factors like historical contingency and global political economy. What that would mean for the core ideas of power resources theory remains unclear. A second answer is that poverty and inequality themselves undermine political mobilization.

So, there could be feedback effects whereby rising inequality undermines power resources, and some of the observed relationship between power resources and lower poverty may have been the artifact of reverse causality. Indeed, Solt shows inequality depresses political interest, the frequency of political discussion, and participation in elections among non-rich citizens also Schaefer Anderson and Beramendi find that the poor are less likely to vote where economic inequality is higher. After all, rising inequality should greatly increase the material interests of the poor and working class in supporting power resources for welfare states and egalitarianism. In contrast to such political-economic models cf. Meltzer-Richard , scholars have shown that rising inequality is not self-correcting, whereby rising inequality prompts the poor and working class to rise up, push back, and successfully demand redistribution.

The reality is that the poor have always been known to be less politically active p. Partly because political action entails costs and requires resources, it is even more difficult to mobilize disadvantaged populations when they face the pressure and seemingly insurmountable constraint of rising inequality. As Pontusson and Rueda show, it is essential for the poor to remain politically active and mobilized for there to be any possibility that rising inequality motivates the poor and working class to successfully demand redistribution.

The outcome of this dilemma is that there is little reason to be optimistic about the present state of power resources representing the poor. The second dilemma, which is linked to the first, is that there is considerable evidence that Left collective actors have become less efficacious. Beginning around , scholars began to demonstrate that the relationship between power resources and welfare states weakened in the s Hicks ; Huber and Stephens When decomposing the rich democracies into historical periods of welfare state development and retrenchment e.

On balance, there is still evidence of party effects on poverty e. However, the prevailing theme in the literature is that power resources have become less effective at least in terms of expanding the welfare state. Unfortunately, the literature has not made great progress in understanding precisely why and how this weakening effectiveness of power resources has occurred. One explanation is that rising inequality, and the ensuing political weakness of the poor, shifts the incentives and platforms of political parties toward middle-class and affluent voters Anderson and Beramendi ; Barth et al. Thus, power resources might matter less to poverty in recent years because Left parties have shifted Right on economic issues, and this has weakened the commitment of Left parties to economic egalitarianism.

Shifting to the institutions literature, the most important dilemma may come from the dualization literature Emmenegger et al. Increasingly, scholars have emphasized that while labor market and educational institutions are generally equality enhancing, there is considerable stratification in the benefits of these institutions. Dualization scholars build on the classic literature on dual labor markets e. Dual labor market scholars argued the U. The new dualization literature builds on this classic literature to emphasize how labor market and demographic changes present new challenges to previously egalitarian institutions. Beginning especially in the late s, many institutions and regulations were reformed by, for example, increasing part-time and temporary work and subsidizing low-wage work to create an increasingly large segment of peripheral workers or outsiders in the labor market.

Scholars have argued that the result is a dualization of social policies and labor market institutions, with one set of programs for labor market insiders and one for outsiders Palier and Thelen So, instead of massive retrenchment of social policies and liberalization of labor market institutions, reform has often been accomplished by dualization Thelen The dualization literature highlights that many workers are stuck in a secondary track of social policies, do not benefit from the traditional egalitarian institutions, and may even have blocked or restricted access to the most generous programs. Importantly, such outsiders are more likely to be women, immigrants, the young, and the less skilled or educated. Because these groups were already more likely to be poor, dualization could be very relevant to poverty in rich democracies.

If so, the traditional literatures on power resources, welfare states, and institutions will need revision for explaining poverty Thelen Particularly interesting is how dualization is emerging at the same time that countries are becoming more egalitarian in other dimensions. For example, Ferragina and colleagues show how unemployment protection has dualized in many rich democracies at the same time that family policy has become increasingly socialized.

Hence, the emergence of dualization is not an isolated trend, but is one of several changes occurring in the policy and institutional context for poverty. Another dilemma for research on institutions and poverty is the need for studies of the complementarities, constellations, and combinations between various institutions. The literature has long emphasized that a given institution affects poverty and inequality because of the presence of other complementary institutions and the effectiveness of various institutions interdepends on other institutions Hall and Soskice ; Thelen Of course, it is clear that there are strong correlations between the presence of labor market institutions, like corporatism, and the presence of vocational education systems, unionization, proportional representation, and other institutions.

So, even power resources like labor and business behave differently depending on the combination of institutions in which they operate. Yet, even though the literature has widely stressed both the essential role of complementarities and the correlations between the presence of various institutions, relatively few studies directly incorporate this into the evaluation of institutional effects on poverty and inequality. For the institutional literature to really demonstrate the theoretical arguments about complementarities and constellations, it would be valuable to more explicitly interrogate interactions between and combinations of institutions. The last challenge we discuss pertains to the majority of the literatures reviewed in this essay.

Despite the progress that has been made in studying how politics and institutions shape poverty and inequality, causality deserves greater scrutiny. While the literature often traditionally focuses on stable differences between countries, the methodological literature on causality increasingly scrutinizes counterfactuals and on identifying exogenous effects. The power resources and institutional literatures have only begun to embrace the shift toward counterfactual causality. Indeed, a key challenge for these literatures is the difficulty of reconciling the theoretical interest in big, long-term processes e.

Indeed, it may be reasonable to perceive a tradeoff between theoretical attention on big, long-term process and macrocomparison and the identification of causal effects. There are several reasons it is so difficult to identify causal effects while focusing on macrolevel context and cross-national differences. Second, power resources and institutions are often bundled with and complementary to other power resources, institutions, and state policies. As a result, it is difficult to untangle complementary and coevolved power resources and institutions and to sort out what effects are due to which precise power resource or institutions. Third, while scholars need macro and historical variation to find variation in power resources and institutions, such macro and historical variation is vulnerable to omitted variable bias.

It is always difficult to say one has controlled for all differences between countries or historical periods, and biases due to omitted variables are usually plausible. Fourth, the literature has a desire to study the more fundamental and basic causes that precede complex causal chains and underlie more proximate predictors of poverty. Pushing against the individualism of poverty, the literature on politics and institutions has sought to understand contextual differences in poverty across time and place Brady et al. Though these matters have not been fully resolved, scholars are beginning to provide more rigorous causal evidence while maintaining the theoretical foci of power resources and institutional theories.

Compared to the past, more studies are analyzing change over time within contexts and controlling for stable differences between contexts. Some have utilized instrumental variables or compared across geographically proximate and similar countries to simulate natural experiments or more carefully compare like with like. The advancing presence of multi-level analyses in this literature has allowed for a consideration of macro-level contexts and micro-level risks in p.

Even though multi-level approaches also have causality challenges, they have shifted attention away from questions exclusively focused on micro-level individual characteristics and demographic risks, and ensured that power resources and institutions are brought into studies of individual-level poverty Brady et al. Finally, scholars are increasingly using research designs that display both variation between places and variation within places over time e. In the end, the challenges of advancing causal approaches within this literature present an excellent opportunity for future research.

The next wave of progress in studying how politics and institutions shape poverty and inequality will likely utilize innovative research designs and clever estimation strategies to provide new and even more rigorous evidence. In addition to encouraging greater scrutiny of causality, we conclude by proposing that all the dilemmas and challenges in this section present a promising agenda for future research. We argued at the outset that politics and institutions have never been as prominent in the social sciences of poverty as they are today. If we are correct, these challenges and dilemmas suggest an exciting emerging literature, and one that has the potential to make politics and institutions even more central to understanding poverty.

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This also reduces the average product of labour. Because the average product of labour diminishes as more labour is devoted to farming, their incomes inevitably fall. On its own, the diminishing average product of labour does not explain the long, flat portion of the hockey stick. It just means that living standards depend on the size of the population. Malthus was not the first person to have this idea. Elevated as man is above all other animals by his intellectual facilities, it is not to be supposed that the physical laws to which he is subjected should be essentially different from those which are observed to prevail in other parts of the animated nature.

Imagine a herd of antelopes on a vast and otherwise empty plain. Imagine also that there are no predators to complicate their lives or our analysis. When the antelopes are better fed, they live longer and have more offspring. When the herd is small, the antelopes can eat all they want, and the herd gets larger. Eventually the herd will get so large relative to the size of the plain that the antelopes can no longer eat all they want. As the amount of land per animal declines, their living standards will start to fall. This reduction in living standards will continue as long as the herd continues to increase in size. Since each animal has less food to eat, the antelopes will have fewer offspring and die younger so population growth will slow down.

Eventually, living standards will fall to the point where the herd is no longer increasing in size. The antelopes have filled up the plain. At this point, each animal will be eating an amount of food that we will define as the subsistence level. If antelopes eat less than the subsistence level, the herd starts to get smaller. And when consumption exceeds the subsistence level, the herd grows. Much of the same logic would apply, Malthus reasoned, to a human population living in a country with a fixed supply of agricultural land. Falling living standards would slow population growth as death rates increased and birth rates fell; ultimately incomes would settle at the subsistence level.

The variables that stay constant in this equilibrium are:. If conditions change, then population and incomes may change too, but eventually the economy will return to an equilibrium with income at subsistence level. We know that over the centuries before the Industrial Revolution, improvements in technology occurred in many regions of the world, including Britain, and yet living standards remained constant.

In the figure, things on the left are causes of things to the right. Beginning from equilibrium, with income at subsistence level, a new technology such as an improved seed raises income per person on the existing fixed quantity of land. Higher living standards lead to an increase in population. As more people are added to the land, diminishing average product of labour means average income per person falls. Eventually incomes return to subsistence level, with a higher population.

Why is the population higher at the new equilibrium? Output per farmer is now higher for each number of farmers. Population does not fall back to the original level, because income would be above subsistence. A better technology can provide subsistence income for a larger population. The Malthusian model predicts that improvements in technology will not raise living standards if:. Then in the long run, an increase in productivity will result in a larger population but not higher wages.

The downward-sloping line in the left-hand figure shows that the higher the population, the lower the level of wages, due to the diminishing average product of labour. The upward-sloping line on the right shows the relationship between wages and population growth. When wages are high, population grows, because higher living standards lead to more births and fewer deaths. At a medium population level, the wage of people who work the land is at subsistence level point A. The wage is higher at point B, where the population is smaller, because the average product of labour is higher. The line in the right-hand diagram slopes upward, showing that when wages on the vertical axis are high, population growth on the horizontal axis is positive so the population will rise.

When wages are low, population growth is negative population falls. At point A, on the left, population is medium-sized and the wage is at subsistence level. So if the economy is at point A, it is in equilibrium: population stays constant and wages remain at subsistence level. Suppose the economy is at B, with a higher wage and lower population. As the population rises, the economy moves down the line in the left diagram: wages fall until they reach equilibrium at A. The two diagrams together explain the Malthusian population trap.

Population will be constant when the wage is at subsistence level, it will rise when the wage is above subsistence level, and it will fall when the wage is below subsistence level. The economy starts at point A, with a medium-sized population and wage at subsistence level. A technological improvement for example, better seeds raises the average product of labour, and the wage is higher for any level of population. The real wage line shifts upward. At the initial population level, the wage increases and the economy moves to point D. As population rises, the wage falls, due to the diminishing average product of labour. The economy moves down the real-wage curve from D.

At C, the wage has reached subsistence level again. The population is higher at equilibrium C than it was at equilibrium A. Imagine that the population growth curve in the right panel of Figure 2. Explain what would happen to living standards describing the transition to the new equilibrium. The major long-run impact of better technology in this Malthusian world was therefore more people. The writer H. So we now have a possible explanation of the long, flat portion of the hockey stick. Human beings periodically invented better ways of making things, both in agriculture and in industry, and this periodically raised the incomes of farmers and employees above subsistence. The Malthusian interpretation was that higher real wages led young couples to marry earlier and have more children, and they also led to lower death rates.

Population growth eventually forced real wages back to subsistence levels, which might explain why China and India, with relatively sophisticated economies at the time, ended up with large populations but—until recently—very low incomes. As with our model of innovation rents, relative prices and technological improvements, we need to ask: can we find evidence to support the central prediction of the Malthusian model, that incomes will return to subsistence level? From the end of the thirteenth century to the beginning of the seventeenth century, Britain oscillated between periods of higher wages, leading to larger populations, leading to lower wages, leading to smaller populations, leading to … and so on, a vicious circle.

We get a different view of the vicious circle by taking Figure 2. The lower part of the figure shows the causal linkages that led to the effects we see in the top part. In this figure, we examine the Malthusian economy that existed in England between the years and , highlighted above. The bubonic plague of —50 was known as the Black Death. It killed 1. This decline in the population had an economic benefit for the farmers and workers who survived: it meant that farmers had more and better land, and workers could demand higher wages. Incomes rose as the plague abated. By the middle of the fifteenth century, the real wages of English building workers had doubled. By , real wages had fallen to the level they were years previously.

Our model of Malthusian economics helps to explain the rise and fall of incomes between and in England. The decline of the number of people working on farms during the Black Death raised agricultural productivity according to the principle of diminishing average product of labour. Farmers were better off, whether they owned their land or paid a fixed rent to a landlord. Employers in cities had to offer higher wages too, to attract workers from rural areas.

The causal links in Figure 2. But when the population recovered in the sixteenth century, labour supply increased, lowering wages. Based on this evidence, the Malthusian explanation is consistent with the history of England at this time. The cause-and-effect diagram that we created in Figure 2. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the wages of unskilled workers relative to the incomes of land owners were only one-fifth of what they had been in the sixteenth century. Real wages also rose sharply following the Black Death in other places for which we have evidence, such as Spain, Italy, Egypt, the Balkans, and Constantinople present-day Istanbul. We have focused on farmers and wage earners, but not everyone in the economy would be caught in a Malthusian trap.

As population continues to grow, the demand for food also grows. Therefore the limited amount of land used to produce the food should become more valuable. In a Malthusian world, a rising population should therefore lead to an improvement in the relative economic position of landowners. This occurred in England: Figure 2. And the income gap between landowners and workers increased. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the wages of unskilled English workers, relative to the incomes of landowners, were only one-fifth of what they had been in the sixteenth century.

Nassau Senior, the economist who lamented that the numbers perishing in the Irish famine would scarcely be enough to do much good, does not appear compassionate. But he and Malthus were right to think that population growth and a diminishing average product of labour could create a vicious circle of economic stagnation and poverty. However, the hockey-stick graphs of living standards show they were wrong to believe that this could never change.

They did not consider the possibility that improvements in technology could happen at a faster rate than population growth, offsetting the diminishing average product of labour. The permanent technological revolution, it turns out, means that the Malthusian model is no longer a reasonable description of the world. Average living standards increased rapidly and permanently after the capitalist revolution. As we saw in Figure 2. Between the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century, although wages rose there was relatively little population growth. Then, around , the economy moved to what appears to be an entirely new regime, with both population and real wages simultaneously increasing. Note: Labour productivity and real wages are five-year centred moving averages.

In the eighteenth century, the Malthusian relationship persisted. In the nineteenth century, the economy appears to become a non-Malthusian regime, with real wages rising while population was increasing. The story begins with technological improvements, such as the spinning jenny and the steam engine, that increased output per worker. Innovation continued as the technological revolution became permanent, displacing thousands of spinsters, weavers and farmers. In the s, higher productivity and low wages led to a surge in profits. Profits, competition, and technology drove businesses to expand. The demand for labour went up. People left farming for jobs in the new factories.

The supply of labour fell when business owners were stopped from employing children. The power of working people increased as they gained the right to vote and formed trade unions. These workers were able to claim a constant or rising share of the increases in productivity generated by the permanent technological revolution. The story of the permanent technological revolution demonstrates that there are two influences on wages.

Britain had escaped from the Malthusian trap. This process would soon be repeated in other countries, as Figures 1. According to Malthus, with diminishing average product of labour in production and population growth in response to increases in real wages, an increase in productivity will result in a larger population but not higher real wages in the long run. Based on the information above, which of the following statements is correct? The escape from the Malthusian trap, in which technological progress outstripped the effects of population growth, took place following the emergence of capitalism.

Consider the three basic institutions of capitalism in turn:. Testing this model against historical evidence shows that it could help to explain why the Industrial Revolution occurred in Britain in the eighteenth century. We showed how the Malthusian model of a vicious circle, in which population growth offset temporary gains in income, could explain stagnation in living standards for centuries before the Industrial Revolution, until the permanent technological revolution allowed an escape due to improvements in technology.

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History, instability, and growth Innovation. Question 2. The average wage in was about the same as that in in nominal terms pounds. The average real wage was more or less constant between and This is a graph of an index of real wages. The index is approximately in , but this does not tell us what the money wage was. The wages graphed are real wages, so are adjusted to take account of changes in prices. Whilst the graph looks fairly constant between and compared to the rapid increase since , the average real wage actually almost doubled and then halved again between and look at the scale on the vertical axis.

In , the real wage index was approximately By , the index had increased by roughly six times that value, to more than History, instability, and growth Global economy Innovation. The amount you pay your landlord for the use of an apartment. The amount you pay to hire a car for a weekend. The extra profit that a successful innovator makes on bringing a new product to the market before its competitors.

The extra profit that a firm makes when it doubles in size and there are no changes to costs or the price for each unit of its output. This is the rent as used in everyday language. Economic rent is something you would like to get and not something you have to pay. An economic rent is what you earn above the next best alternative, which in this case may be the additional earnings compared to subletting the land to someone else at the same rate. This particular form of economic rent is called an innovation rent, where profits are made in excess of those offered by the next best alternative due to the adoption of new technology. This would be the normal profit you can earn in return for hard work. An economic rent is what you earn over and above the next best option, for example working really hard in another job.

From the graph, what can we conclude? Technology D is more energy-intensive than technology C. Technology B dominates technology D. Technology A is the cost-minimizing technology at all prices of coal and wages. Technology C can sometimes be a cheaper technology than A. Technology D uses more workers and less coal, and therefore is more labour-intensive than C. Technology B uses fewer workers and fewer tonnes of coal than technology D to produce the same amount of cloth, so it dominates D.

Technology A would be costlier than B, D or E if the price of coal were much higher than the wage level. Technology C is dominated by A as it uses both more workers and more coal than A. Therefore it can never be a cheaper technology than A. Based on this information, what can we conclude? Isocost HJ represents all points that can produce metres of cloth at a particular price ratio. At these prices, N and B are on the same isocost line. These two combinations of inputs cost the same. The price ratio is equal to the slope of an isocost; since isocosts MN and FG have the same slope, we can infer that they represent the same price ratio. MN is higher than FG, so represents higher total costs.

An isocost represents all combinations of workers and tonnes of coal for which the total cost of production is the same. Along isocost HJ we know that at point B 4 workers and 2 tonnes of coal the technology can produce metres of cloth. If a technology were available to produce at another point on the line it would not necessarily produce metres of cloth. History, instability, and growth Inequality Innovation. Old technology New technology Lots of workers Few workers Little machinery spinning wheels Lots of capital goods spinning mules, factory buildings, water wheels or steam engines … requiring only human energy … requiring energy coal Labour-intensive Labour-saving Capital-saving Capital-intensive Energy-saving Energy-intensive.

View this data at OWiD. Other video options Bilibili Download View transcript. Which of the following is true? The flatter isocost line HJ for s Britain indicates higher wages relative to the price of coal. The increase in wages relative to the cost of energy in the s is represented by the outward shift of the isocost line from HJ to the parallel isocost line going through A. Had the wage level fallen together with the falling energy costs due for example to cheaper transportation , then s Britain would definitely have stayed with technology B. The comparison between isocost line FG and the parallel isocost going through B suggests that an innovation rent was earned in s Britain when firms moved from technology B to A.

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The Legislature shall pass such laws as may be necessary to enforce this provision. No Chinese shall be employed on any State, county, municipal, or other public work, except in punishment for crime. The Legislature shall delegate all necessary power to the incorporated cities and towns of this State for the removal of Chinese without the limits of such cities and towns, or for their location within prescribed portions of those limits, and it shall also provide the necessary legislation to prohibit the introduction into this State of Chinese after the adoption of this Constitution. The Chinese in America : a narrative history. New York: Penguin. History Teacher. Google Docs.

Retrieved December 7, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute. Archived from the original on March 8, January 1, South End Press. April 17, October 18, American Presidency Project. Archived from the original on April 4, Retrieved April 4, Indians in North America, nearly 90 percent of whom where Sikhs from the state of Punjab, were also racialized through colonial gendered discourses. Retrieved May 8, Journal of Organizational Behavior. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology. Retrieved December 4, Bias Crimes and Incidents Synopsis. Seattle: Seattle Police Department Memorandum, March 23, Retrieved April 29, Accessed July 17, In addition to job postings, the article also surveys evidence relevant to several of Jensen's subsidiary arguments, including lawsuits involving NINA publications, NINA restrictions in housing solicitations, Irish-American responses to NINA advertisements, and the use of NINA advertisements in Confederate propaganda", and concludes per the abstract that "Jensen's thesis about the highly limited extent of NINA postings requires revision", and that "the earlier view of historians generally accepting the widespread reality of the NINA phenomenon is better supported by the currently available evidence.

July 7, Long Island Wins. Retrieved August 16, February 15, The Color of Race in America, — Good Housekeeping : Department of State Office of the Historian. Retrieved February 13, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Historical Materialism. Greenwood Publishing Group. Westminster: Desegregating California's Schools". December 22, February 16, December 21, Archived from the original on August 18, The International migration review. Summer, , pp. Assyrian International News Agency. Retrieved February 9, University of California, Irvine.

Western Knight Center. July 28, " PDF. In Zahia Smail Salhi ed. The Arab diaspora: Voices of an anguished scream. Human Rights Watch. September 11, Religious racialization conflates Arabs and Islam, and consequently positions all Arabs as Muslim; represents Islam as a monolithic religion erasing diversity among Arabs and Muslims; and marks Islam as a backwards, fanatical, uncivilized, and a terroristic belief system" p.

Alsultany, Evelyn Duke University Press. CBS News. Anti-Defamation League. Archived from the original on July 18, Retrieved July 18, Asian Law Journal. The Iranian. Retrieved February 2, Media and the Middle East: Image and Perception. Praeger, ; Greenwood, Jersey City Nj. Retrieved August 11, Archived from the original on January 2, Retrieved January 9, Southern Poverty Law Center. Retrieved July 5, Oney, , p.

Time magazine. April 9,

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