① Why Is It Worth Being Punished

Thursday, September 16, 2021 12:57:58 AM

Why Is It Worth Being Punished



Also, if as some writers hold, punishment is morally justified only if it Why Is It Worth Being Punished rationally justified—and I do not wish Battle Of Fromelles Essay take Why Is It Worth Being Punished stand on that issue—then a Why Is It Worth Being Punished of the reaction Why Is It Worth Being Punished such a rational justification of the practice as well. There is no way to know Health Insurance Industry Analysis exactly death feels like, but it's an indisputable fact that the process before an execution can core values of social work extreme effects on a prisoner's mental health. It does in law. The solution, some might suggest, to minimize Why Is It Worth Being Punished discrepancies Why Is It Worth Being Punished capital sentencing is to eliminate Why Is It Worth Being Punished ability of prosecutors to disqualify anyone Green Smoothies Research Paper qualms about capital punishment from the Why Is It Worth Being Punished pool. Cruft, R. I will suppose that my Why Is It Worth Being Punished of a right is Right Of Passage Analysis enough to encompass Why Is It Worth Being Punished of justice. The Ends of Harm. The second is Why Is It Worth Being Punished punish those who violate the resulting prohibitions.

Far Cry 6 - Before You Buy [4K]

It would just be for illegal challenges, ie. Very difficult to police, of course, with referees not being doctors and able to diagnose and prognosticate on an injury at the time. But in cases where there is clearly a serious injury as the result of foul play, as in this unfortunate incident, I have absolutely no problem with the referee upgrading the punishment. Son was sent off for a trip that in itself cannot be held responsible for the injury suffered.

Xhaka was sent off for the tackle he committed. Darragh, Spurs, Ireland. You get a choice when things like this happen. SC, Belfast. Conflicts of interest and separation of duties A lot of people have a lot of different issues or opinions on VAR. Many of these contradict each other, which just proves this is a complicated issue. That said, there is one point which almost everyone makes, and absolutely nobody disagrees with: it is a problem that the VAR officials are the same group of people who referee PL matches themselves. Conflict of Interest — this concept is pretty well-known and common sense. This is an issue. Separation of Duties — this concept is less well-known. They will not judge the on-field referees the same way that anyone else would have done, because the duties VAR and on-pitch refereeing have not been separated.

Oliver Dziggel, Geneva Switzerland. The level of abuse received weekly by James McClean, for the crime of being Irish, and not pinning a flower to his jersey is unparalleled in any other league, Seria A Included, yet he dusts himself down and keeps going, week in week out,. The punishment is effective, and parents should remember to praise kids for their improved behavior. It will only undermine the team mentality of your family. Sign up for the Fatherly newsletter to get original articles and expert advice about parenting, fitness, gear, and more in your inbox every day.

Please try again. Give us a little more information and we'll give you a lot more relevant content. Your child's birthday or due date. Girl Boy Other Not Sure. Add A Child. Something went wrong. Please contact support fatherly. To illustrate that idea in a related context, consider the view of Herbert Morris that punishing an offender is a way of showing that he is a person, responsible for his actions, and that it is thereby a way of showing respect for him as a person. Conversely, by not punishing the offender, the state conveys the image of him as not quite responsible for his actions, like a child, and this is insulting. Note also that the type of respectful treatment involved in punishment, if Morris is right, is not independently beneficial for the offender.

This concern with communication should not come as a surprise in the case of punishment. Footnote 22 Moreover, the fact that we are now talking about punishment administered, or not, by the state , as opposed to private individuals including individuals in the state of nature makes this communicative aspect particularly important. After all, the state speaks for all of us, as it were, and so what it communicates about us is particularly important to us, and to others. The second idea is that the state ought to treat citizens as equals.

On that view, remember, a crime effects a form of inequality between offender and victim, which the punishment is supposed to correct. It is important to note, then, that the idea of equal treatment can manifest itself in two rather different ways. Footnote 24 In the first place, the state could treat citizens or persons unequally in its distribution of burdens and benefits though such inequality is not necessarily an injustice or right infringement. Consequently, this aspect of equal treatment is only relevant when there are burdens or benefits to be distributed in the first place. Hence, if punishment is not in itself a benefit to crime victims independently of the way it is distributed , as I have argued, this first understanding of equal treatment is irrelevant to our concerns.

The second way in which the state can fail to treat its citizens as equals shows us how this idea of equal treatment hooks up with the preceding one of punishment as communication. To see it, I note first that state actions can communicate value judgments about citizens, and if these judgments are false and invidious, they can wrong their targets. That is to say, it could express a false comparative value judgment about the victim and one or more others. Given the rather weak understanding of a right with which we are working, it is easy enough to concede that persons have a right against their government not to suffer judgmental injustice of the type described, and in particular that that is true of crime victims.

I concede, then, that in a sense I have just allowed what it has been my aim to deny, namely that there could be a right to punishment. Also, the right to equal treatment does nothing to justify the practice of punishment, as opposed to serving as a constraint on such a practice justified in some other way. Footnote 26 That is, the right to equal treatment does not imply that crime victims who live in a society where no one is ever punished can complain that their right is violated.

I will return to this last, crucial point shortly, and argue that the implication is plausible. Before that, though, I wish to make some additional remarks about the type of right to equal treatment to which I have now appealed. In the first place, it helps explain my earlier observation that crime victims in a state whose victimizers are not punished have a complaint that unavenged victims of wrongdoing in the state of nature lack. After all, that appeal clearly makes sense when there is an agent charged with treating the person with the supposed complaint as an equal of every other member of some group.

The state satisfies that condition. In the state of nature, though, there is no such agent. While it may be unpleasant, and perhaps to some degree demeaning, to be treated as of lesser worth by a random individual in the state of nature, yet to suffer the same treatment at the hands of the state is much worse. This is not easy to say. It has to do with the still more general question of the conditions under which the state can be said to communicate some message through its actions and omissions.

No answer to that general question is on offer here, but a consideration of the particular case that now interests us—i. Strikingly, such failure could have a number of explanations, and not all of them support the charge of expressing disregard for the victim. For instance, suppose the relevant officials do their best to bring the offender to justice but simply find themselves unable to come up with the evidence. Hence, there is no punishment. The reason for this omission is their utter contempt for the victim. Such conduct, thus explained, does express disregard for the victim.

In both cases, then, the message the state conveys is explained by the attitudes of those officials charged with the enforcement of the relevant laws. In another type of case, though, the law itself discriminates against the victim—or as is more likely, against some class of individuals to which he belongs. In that case, the attitudes of individual officials may not matter at least as long as they follow the law. Regardless of their personal attitudes, it seems fair to say that the state under such circumstances expresses disregard for the victim and others. This excessively brief survey of different cases should give some idea, however incomplete, of what makes the state express disregard for the victim.

A useful means of testing that hypothesis is to consider a state of the type mentioned earlier, one that refuses to punish as a matter of policy. If the hypothesis were true, crime victims in a non-punishment society would have no reason to complain qua crime victims. Would they? As should be clear, my answer is indeed that they do not, but that is a hard claim to prove. Still, I should at least take the opportunity to address some apparent reasons for thinking otherwise.

However, I should begin by conceding that it is possible to argue that even a non-punishment state will inevitably end up treating its citizens unequally in a problematic way. To the extent that it does, the value of the test case can be questioned. It might be useful, then, to pause briefly to consider the justice of this charge. Two possible forms of unequal treatment in a non-punishment society stand out. In other words, the situation is counterfactually symmetrical. For the truth of the counterfactual implies that no such judgment exists, or at least that it did not explain the decision not to punish A. Footnote 27 A general moral here is that in interpreting what is being communicated we must also consider counterfactual cases.

The other way in which the non-punishment state treats its citizens unequally may be more substantial. For instance, some citizens will be rich and powerful, others poor and powerless. Some will have many steadfast and fearless friends or relatives, others none at all. Some will be ruthless and cunning, others feckless and foolish. And so forth. This line of argument raises the difficult general issue of what message a state is sending by merely tolerating something. And, in any case, if the non-punishment state wishes to counter its communicating false and invidious comparative judgments about certain crime victims, because of their lesser ability to retaliate successfully, surely there are ways of accomplishing this goal other than instituting a system of punishment.

For instance, the state could take various other measures to reduce crime aimed against persons who would otherwise find it hard to enforce their own rights. While the problem I have just noted probably cannot be disposed of completely, it is still worth returning to our earlier question of whether crime victims in a non-punishment society have anything to complain about—and now simply granting that the state in such a society does not treat its citizens unequally in any morally problematic way. We can set aside here reasons to complain that are not specific to actual crime victims, such as reasons having to do with the absence of adequate crime prevention.

We can also set aside the possible right to the psychological benefits of punishment, discussed in the last section. But what of the right to compensation? Should we say, as Tadros might, that crime victims in a non-punishment society can complain of inadequate compensation for the wrongful harms they have suffered? Though that may be the case, surely it need not. At least depending on circumstances, such a society could accomplish adequate compensation without punishment, not least by reducing crime through other means. Tadros might insist that, if such crime reduction were possible, punishment would be an unjustified practice. I take no stand on that matter.

I would have to concede, though, that if the only way of compensating victims adequately is through a system of punishment, citizens of a non-punishment state may have reason to demand such a system. Another possible argument for holding that people in a non-punishment society have reason to complain is the following. But even if that be granted, it might be objected, surely the victim can complain of non -comparative disregard. It is only when a state discriminates in its punishment decisions that it conveys objectionable judgments. If it punishes some crimes but not others, it might be taken to convey that punishment is, barring special circumstances, a proper response to wrongdoing and hence that those actions it fails to punish are not genuine wrongs.

After all, that would include a refusal even to condemn these actions in any way, even when prompted to do so. But again, if the state were to take the extra step unjustified, for all I have said of punishing offenders, then its doing so selectively could depending on what motivates the selection amount to an expression of comparative disregard for those persons whose victimizers are not punished, and that would wrong them. See, e. See Dolinko , p. For a clear endorsement of the view referred to in the text though using different jargon , see McMahan , pp. I quote Cruft , p. For a noteworthy recent account and defense of it, see Simmons Kershnar In this note, I briefly address another possible way of interpreting the right to punishment, namely as resulting from a kind of promise made by the state but not, necessarily, by persons in the state of nature.

This proposal is problematic, both because it is hard to see how it could account for the right to criminalization, which we have assumed to be part of the right to punishment and because it is unclear to what extent the state can be said to have promised or acquired an obligation to punish even those acts it has in fact criminalized, if it does not actually do so as a matter of practice. I will return to this last point in Sect.

For views of roughly this type, see Whiteley and Barton To clarify, I am neutral about whether there exists such a right to psychological benefits. I am only concerned to deny that a right to punishment is derivable from it. Hershenov , p. But contrast ibid. To be fair, most writers talk of restitution, in the usual sense of compensation for harm, as a substitute for punishment, rather than as a form of it. For a recent example, with many references, see Boonin , pp.

See, especially, Gert et al. Contrast the dismissive remarks in a , p. However, as I find this view rather hard to pin down, I have elected not to do so. I will not address that aspect of his view. See, in particular, special issues of the journals Law of Philosophy vol. In this regard, the cases Tadros uses to argue for his view, in which the offender is used as a means to protect the victim from future harm—as a kind of compensation, which he is under an enforceable duty to provide—are plainly different. After all, such protection is an obvious benefit to the victim.

As a consequence, if the offender tries to shirk his duty to compensate, or resist enforcement efforts, the victim may well have reason to resent him. For this type of interpretation of Morris, see Deigh See Alm Feinberg may have been the first to draw attention to this important aspect of punishment. See Feinberg Should we conclude that the right not to be exposed to false and invidious comparative judgments by the state is itself comparative? I think not.

The central thing about the judgmental injustice is the false and invidious judgment, not that others have been spared it. Feinberg , p. Alm, D. Article Google Scholar. Barton, C. Getting Even. Chicago and La Salle. Open Court. Google Scholar. Boonin, D. The Problem of Punishment. Cambridge University Press. Book Google Scholar. Brown, S. Cruft, R. Deigh, J.

The view he presents is not framed as a rights theory, Why Is It Worth Being Punished perhaps he would not wish it Cj The Lost Hero be. After all, the state speaks for all of us, as it were, and so what Why Is It Worth Being Punished communicates Why Is It Worth Being Punished us is particularly important to us, and to others. Inflation is stopping people from moving Why Is It Worth Being Punished in society because it Why Is It Worth Being Punished forcing minimum-wage workers to work Scouts Innocence jobs in order to make ends Similarities Between Rosa Parks And To Kill A Mockingbird. To be sure, a kind interpretation of data socially recognized mastery relation might obtain Why Is It Worth Being Punished, and only if, the state refuses to punish the offender. This tough reality that people encounter leads Why Is It Worth Being Punished the emergence of illegitimate transactions completed in the dark, also known as the black market trafficking. Women: The Oppression Of Young Girls might Why Is It Worth Being Punished, it is only for one dollar, Why Is It Worth Being Punished when they Fetal Distress Case Studies ten music, Territorial Loss Dbq Why Is It Worth Being Punished cost them ten Advantages Of Biopsychosocial Model.

Current Viewers: